Economic Integration in Southern Africa - a Risk of Strong Polarisation Effects or a Chance for Joint Development?

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Abstract

Despite negative experiences with regional integration in sub-Saharan Africa the SADC members announced in August 1996 to make the entire region a free trade area in the next eight years. This article evaluates the opportunity and threats of SADC in order to answer the question whether this integration will lead to strong polarisation effects or an opportunity for joint development in the region. It becomes clear that neither generalisations on welfare gains of regional integration nor generalisations on the distribution of the gains from integration are possible. However a clear tendency for mutual economic benefits of SADC can be deduced. (JEL Classifications: F15, O14)

I. Introduction

In 1992 a new attempt at a regional integration in Southern Africa was
Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe evolving from the former Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC). South Africa and Mauritius joined the SADC later, now making it a twelve member community. Major objectives are to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard of living and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, evolve common political values; systems and institutions and achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and programmes (Madonsela [1996]). A stated aim of SADC, affirmed in August 1996, is to make the entire region a free trade area in the next eight years. It is generally expected that this regional integration will enhance economic welfare due to gains from trade (Leistner [1995]).

The aim of this article is to evaluate the opportunities and threats of SADC in order to answer the question whether this integration will lead to strong polarisation effects or an opportunity for joint development.

Section II will discuss the influences impeding the effects of regional integration. Section III then analyses into more detail the distribution of gains from trade. A conclusion is given in Section IV.

II. Influences Impeding the Effects of Regional Integration

According to many economists the successful implementation of a regional integration may be disturbed by four main obstacles:

1. unfavourable trade patterns of the member countries mainly based on raw material exports, which allow only limited room for gains from regional integration,

2. high percentage of government revenue out of customs duties in many member countries makes tariffs reduction difficult,

3. a country’s unwillingness to sacrifice sovereignty as a precondition for
materials that are not mostly traded among each other but are exported to the developed economies, where they seldom face tariff problems. Almost 80% of intraregional trade is already free but the remaining 20% includes "sensible" products which are of major interests to the countries, like textiles, sugar or automotives. In these fields there is still a large potential for trade creation through tariffs reduction - there is room for gains from a SADC.

(2) A major problem within regional integrations among developing countries is the loss in government revenues from import duties. Customs duties generally account for 20-30% of government revenue in the SADC countries (Leistner [1996]). This is especially important inside the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) founded by South Africa, Lesotho, Swaziland, Botswana and Namibia in 1969 with antecedents going back to the nineteenth century. Goods move freely between members with a common tariff on goods imported from outside. The duties are paid into a common pool administered by the South African Reserve Bank. Revenues are paid out annually in proportion to the value of members' imports and their production and consumption of dutiable goods. As the budgets of several member countries rely heavily on their share of customs income, any significant cuts in import duties would have to be factored into a new agreement (McCarthy [1994b]).

Even if there is a low level of intraregional trade in SADC (5% of recorded trade, Leistner [1996]) a high share of total customs duties on government revenues make the individual country very inflexible in trade negotiations. There is especially the danger of a purely inward oriented regional integration with high external tariffs towards non-SADC countries. Inward-orientation is a major reason for the failure of many regional agreements in Africa or South America. Only if regionalisation is conducted with an orientation
in every SADC member country is necessary as well as realistic phase-in periods to enable the governments to gradually change their public finance system. This effort however is quite independent of the SADC because it is one main target of the structural adjustment programmes of the IMF and the World Bank in sub-Saharan Africa (The World Bank [1994]). It should be clear that adjustment programmes are the alternative to the SADC.

(3) Regionalisation trends since the beginning of the nineties have been or soon will be directed towards a greater participation in the world market, by means of the creation of an attractive internal market, no longer cut off from events on the world market (Rubio [1991]). The globalisation of markets and the internationalisation of production have further led to a transition from national to „international economies“ whose behaviour influences other countries and which are themselves influenced by other countries, so that national arguments become increasingly irrelevant. Nevertheless – like anywhere else in the world – there is a big problem due to countries’ unwillingness to sacrifice policy sovereignty to a regional institution.

The problem is twofold. For RSA as the dominating economy in the region the formation of SADC will reduce its sovereignty in exchange for economic progress, e.g. industry exports or the medium to long term reduction of illegal migration. Here RSA will have to take a political decision based on a value judgement of long term regional perspectives and short term national interests (Ödén [1996b]). For the other SADC states the opposite is true. With regional integration the degree of responsibility for their own respective country will be enhanced because the alternative – constantly relying on IMF and World Bank and others’ donor capital with their conditionality – can be reduced.

(4) Generally regional integration concentrates on the creation of trade. The trade-creation effect is one of the non-monetary effects of regional inte-
less competitive products (mean the same products at higher prices) from
the participating countries, which are cheaper because of the reduction in
tariffs. From a purely theoretical point of view, therefore the whole theory
of regional integration belongs to the theory of second best. Thus, a move-
ment towards one condition for Pareto optimality by reducing tariffs on
imports from one source may not be welfare improving unless other condi-
tions are fulfilled, which they are not when tariffs remain on non-preferred
(third-countries) imports (Lipsey and Lancaster [1956/57]). This is the rea-
son why generalisations on welfare gains from regional integration are hard
to make thus opening up the field on non-economic motivation for or against
regional integration (Pomfret [1986]).

The traditional argumentation indicates that the liberalisation of trade
tends to polarise regional development in the more advanced partner coun-
tries (Leistner [1996]). Initial regional disparities are thus perpetuated by a
cumulative process and industrial growth tends to gravitate towards the eco-
nomically more advanced countries (McCarthy [1994a]).

Section III will therefore further analyse the distribution of gains from
trade as an issue of paramount importance for the implementation of the
regional trade agreement.

III. Distribution of Gains from Trade

As Krugman has noted a full analysis of the costs and benefits of regional
trade agreements requires not only a strong theoretical base but also an
analysis of the bargaining process in the trade negotiations (Krugman
[1991]). A decision tree of a bargaining process in trade negotiation con-
tains 4 steps (Figure 1). The first decision is centered around the political
will towards substantial regional integration. If this hurdle is taken, the
simple trade model (Figure 2). The starting point is the equilibrium $E$ in isolation. As nation 1 specialises in the production of commodity $A$ and moves down its production frontier, it incurs increasing opportunity costs in the production of $A$ as is reflected in the increasing slope of its production frontier. For nation 2 the same effect will take place with commodity $B$. The process of specialisation in production continues until relative commodity prices $P_A$ and $P_B$ become equal in the two nations. The gains from trade
The common price $P_W$ (line $G-F$) defines the terms of trade between the two economies. They indicate the terms on which each economy can acquire imports from the other. In Figure 2, an increase in the relative price
olution for developing countries according the Prebisch-Singer thesis and extending this thesis to all unequal economic environments, a bias of the gains from trade towards the more developed countries can be expected.

To evaluate the distribution of gains from trade in SADC in this statical model only intraregional trade is relevant which is low, accounting for less than 5% of recorded trade (Leistner [1996]).

Figure 3 shows the development of the terms of trade of selected smaller SADC members in comparison to the terms of trade of South Africa and the United Kingdom as a reference group.

There is no clear trend in the development of the terms of trade over time. While the smaller SADC countries demonstrate a rather erratic development, the United Kingdom shows a rather stagnant development and South Africa’s terms of trade are falling slightly. In a broad survey of the adjustment efforts in sub-Saharan Africa for 27 countries an average annualised change in external income due to changes in the terms of trade of - 0.4% was detected for the 1981-1991 period (The World Bank [1994]).

Whereas the trade structure of the smaller SADC members is more or less similar in their total trade and their intraregional trade, South Africa has the traditional trade structure of a developing country in its total trade but in intraregional trade it is similar to a developed country. Inside SADC South Africa runs a high trade surplus based on the exports of industrialized goods. But altogether there is no clear indication of the relevance of the argumentation of a bias in the distribution of the gains from trade due to negative terms of trade effects - especially not with a constant deterioration of the South African Rand, which negatively affects the quality of the indicator terms of trade.

Additionally, a statical indicator - only appropriate to characterize comparative statical situations - does not seem to be methodologically adequate to
region (e.g. SADC) as well as within a country (Eastern Cape – Witwatersrand). These models suggest that within a region the growth inducing trickle-down effects of trade are small compared with the negative “backwash effects” for the less developed countries. The economically more developed countries will attract industry because of increasing returns to scale, the better availability of a trained workforce and the existence of necessary industrial services like finance, transport and lawyers (McCarthy [1994a]). As a consequence, labour-intensive craft industries in the less developed countries decline due to the inability to compete with cheap imported mass produced goods from economically more developed countries within the region. As an extension of Myrdal’s thoughts Kaldor [1970] and Dixon and Thirwall [1975] developed a formal model of cumulative causation which consists of four equations based on four assumptions:
\[ g = f^3(w_e), \text{ where } f^3 \text{ is falling and } < 0. \]

(4) The money wages and their rate of increase will be similar in all countries

\[ w_m = W. \]

If the four equations are put together (Figure 4) the cumulative causation becomes evident. Rising growth rates in output induce higher productivity which reduces efficiency wages, and in turn the fall in efficiency wages leads to a higher growth rate in output and so on.

The economically more developed countries at a starting point \( g_0 \) will benefit from higher output and productivity growth so that this cumulative causation model supports the argumentation that a regional integration between unequal partners tends to bias the distribution of gains towards the more advanced partner because the benefits vary according to the type of

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**Figure 4**

*Gains from Trade in the Theoretical Cumulative Causation Model for a More Advanced Country*
productive activity in which a region specialises. Some sectors are more susceptible to productivity gains than others. In particular, the manufacturing sector is able to reap substantially greater benefits from growth than are land-based activities such as mining and agriculture. The consequence of this bias in the potential for exploiting the benefits from greater specialisation due to regional integration leads to the prediction that countries specialising in land-base activities are likely to grow slower than those specialising in manufacturing activities.

Krugman and Venables [1995] deduce a similar cumulative causation process by analysing regional differentiation (core-periphery) driven by the interaction of scale economies and transport costs.

The Kaldor model leads to two main hypotheses: (a) the money wages and their rates of increase are approximately the same in all countries and (b) a region’s rate of productivity growth is an increasing function of its rate of growth of output (Richardson [1977]). A look at the AFTA, MERCOSUR or NAFTA rapidly indicates that there is no similar money wage in the respective regions e.g. because of restrictions in labour mobility or different economic institutions in the countries. The hypotheses might be true in a very distant future but this is not the problem today and tomorrow. The remaining money wage gap between different countries involved in a regional integration will nevertheless aggravate the problems of (illegal) migration in the short run. The illegal inflow of labour to the more developed countries generates social and political pressure within the countries but also between them. The experiences of the border region between the United States and Mexico, where there is a worldwide unique situation of a 3000 km common border between an industrialized and a developing country, show that even with the extremely resource intensive U.S. border patrol system, the illegal inflow of Mexicans cannot be stopped. This insight was
the region is therefore not hindering but favouring regional integration.

The second hypotheses is not that easy to reject. It is basically true for the developed countries in the EU. For the Asian economies there is an intensive debate around the future sustainability of the tremendous growth rates these countries have been experiencing for at least 10 years. Kaldor assumed a high correlation between productivity growth and growth of output. A look at the contribution to growth for the high growth countries Singapore, South Korea or Taiwan shows a different picture. In growth theory the GDP growth rate is explained by:

\[ \Delta GDP = \Delta \text{Capital Contribution} + \Delta \text{Labour Contribution} + \Delta \text{Total Factor Productivity}. \]

Due to a strongly rising investment rate and labour-force participation rate the “residual” total factor productivity accounts for only 10-15% of growth in the three high-growth Asian countries (Behravesh [1996]). So, factor accumulation not productivity progress is the explanation for growth, with the consequence that the second hypothesis of Kaldor is not relevant either.

But neither the traditional static model explaining the distribution of gains from trade according to the terms of trade nor the cumulative causation model of Myrdal and Kaldor are able to prove a bias in the distribution of gains from trade for SADC. This result contrasts on a first glance the results of Krugman and Venables [1995]. Their model predicts a first stage of growing inequality (in the real wages) due to falling transport cost leading to a core periphery situation. Assuming transportation cost keeps falling the lower wage rates in the periphery will offset the agglomeration advantages of the core in a second stage (Krugman and Venables [1995]). This will lead to a reduction of the inequality. Transport costs in SADC outside RSA are extremely high due to the poor infrastructure with the consequence that a unequal distribution of gains from trade in SADC might be
possible (Odén [1996a]). Looking at the restrictive assumptions of the Krugman and Venables model (e.g. no labour and capital mobility) it also becomes evident that this model is not able to prove an uneven distribution of gains from trade for SADC.

Furthermore the discussion of inequality must always take into account the fact that in an international comparison with comparable middle income countries “South Africa has one of the worst records in terms of social indicators (..) and of income inequality” (Ministry in the Office of the President [1995]). The homogeneity of the SADC region becomes clearer if the income bias of the white population in South Africa is taken into account. While the black population has a poverty rate of nearly 65% Indians have a poverty rate of only 2.5% and Whites only 0.7% (Ministry in the Office of the President [1995]). Gini coefficients demonstrate that the inequality in the SADC countries is generally higher than for example, in the AFTA countries. While Zimbabwe and Lesotho have an Gini coefficient of 57% Indonesia and the Philippines have 32% and 41% If the dualism of the economic structures is taken into account, i.e. the considerable differences in income and development between the highly developed conurbations e.g. Witwatersrand in South Africa – which themselves show immense income disparities – and the extremely underdeveloped rural areas, the classification of different development levels proves to be highly problematical. South Africa indeed economically dominates the SADC for, its GNP of 125.2 billion US-$ [1994] is almost four times the 33.1 billion US-$ of its eleven SADC partners together (Leistner [1996]) but the majority of the South African population suffers massive development problems. Therefore the inequality between different SADC countries must always be seen in the context of inequality inside a particular SADC country.
market for the smaller SADC-members, the better market access for industrialized products from South Africa in the region, first steps to tackle the illegal migration issues and other effects lead to this consequence. This means that negotiations of a real SADC becomes possible because without mutual gains there is no reason to start substantial negotiations. These negotiations will finally determine the distribution of the gains from trade in SADC and the better each member state can define its goals the better will be the overall negotiation result. It goes without saying that in a complex economic decision not every detail can be assessed due to limited resources. But between repeating general economic principles and assessing an infinite number of aspect is a lot of room for manoeuvre.

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