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Journal of Economic Integration 2003 September;18(3) :573-586.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.11130/jei.2003.18.3.573
Domestic Welfare Effects of Foreign Strategic Trade Policies

Philippe Kohler Michael O. Moore 

Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris
The George Washington University
Copyright ©2003 Journal of Economic Integration
ABSTRACT
Within a duopoly strategic trade policy model, we analyze the effect of foreign strategic trade policies on domestic welfare when the domestic government pursues a laissez-faire import policy. With Cournot competition and domestic production and consumption, an increase in the foreign strategic export subsidy increases domestic welfare when the domestic price exceeds the foreign firm marginal cost. With Bertrand competition, an increase in the foreign strategic export tax has ambiguous effects on domestic welfare and depends on the degree of product differentiation and domestic cross-price elasticity of demand between domestic and foreign goods. JEL Classifications: F13
Keywords: D
 
REFERENCE
1. Brander, J., (1995), "Strategic trade policies", in Handbook of International Economics, Vol. 3, G. Grossman and K. Rogoff, ed. Elsevier, Amsterdam.
2. Carmichael, C., (1987), "The role of export credit subsidies and its welfare consequences", Journal of International Economics, 23, 1-19.
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On Welfare Comparisons among Trade Policies  1995 June;10(2)
The Welfare Effect of Changes in Factor Intensities  1990 September;5(2)
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