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Journal of Economic Integration 2002 April;17(4) :811-825.
Multilateral Tariff Negotiations when Production is Fixed

José Méndez Naya Luciano Méndez Naya 

Universidade de A Coruña
Universidade de Santiago
Copyright ©2002 Journal of Economic Integration
This paper contributes to analysis of the extent to which multilateral trading agreements reached under GATT can liberalize the world economy. Its main conclusion is that free trade is not sustainable if production is fixed exogenously and utility is non-transferable. If production is fixed and utility is transferable, free trade is possible but is not necessary for maximization of welfare. JEL Classification (F12, F13, F15)
Keywords: International Trade | Trade Negotiations | Imperfect Competition
1. Brander, J. A. and P. R. Krugman (1983), "A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade", Journal of International Economics, 15, 313-321.
2. Brander, J. A. and B. Spencer (1985), "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry", Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
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