Register  |  Login  |  Inquiries  |  Sitemap
Advanced Search
Journal of Economic Integration 2003 September;18(3) :506-529.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.11130/jei.2003.18.3.506
On the Lobbying Behavior Response to Political Asymmetries in International Economic Integration
I-Hui Cheng 
National University of Kaohsiung
Copyright ©2003 Journal of Economic Integration
ABSTRACT
The objective of this paper is to examine the effects of political asymmetries on a FTA and a CU. I have shown that either a higher lobbying sensitivity to the foreign firm or a more susceptibility of politicians to lobbying are sufficient to lead to a higher tariff protection at the individual country level. Under a CU, firms may dislike any form of political dominance in the common trade policy unless politicians do not discriminate against foreign lobbyists significantly. In contrast, under a FTA, if politicians are very susceptible to lobbying, the results appear to be ambiguous. JEL Classifications: D72, F13, F15
Keywords: K
Editorial Office
Center for Economic Integration, Sejong Institution, Sejong University, 209, Neungdong-Ro, Gwangjin-Gu,
Seoul, 05006, Korea
TEL : +82-2-3408-3338    FAX : +82-2-3408-3338   E-mail : jei@sejong.ac.kr
Browse Articles |  Current Issue |  For Authors and Reviewers |  About
Copyright© by Center for Economic Integration. All right reserved.