Register  |  Login  |  Inquiries  |  Sitemap
Advanced Search
Journal of Economic Integration 2000 December;15(4) :655-668.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.11130/jei.2000.15.4.655
Design of an Antidumping Law
James C. Hartigan 
Copyright ©2000 Journal of Economic Integration
ABSTRACT
The GATT/WTO requires an investigation documenting unfair pricing and material injury before AD duties can be imposed. Governments have discretion as to how many periods are included in the injury assessment and how long duties remain in effect. An AD law can be designed so that duopolists implement Markov Perfect rather than Nash-Bertrand strategies, affecting the equilibrium only in low demand states. Material injury doesn't occur, and no complaints are filed. This benefits the home firm and harms the foreign firm less than when duties are imposed. The home government also benefits when investigations and visible protection are costly.
Keywords: Dumping | Injury | Investigation | Unfair
TOOLS
PDF Links  PDF Links
Full text via DOI  Full text via DOI
Download Citation  Download Citation
Supplement  Supplement
  E-Mail
Share:      
METRICS
1
Crossref
0
Scopus
1,311
View
4
Download
Editorial Office
Center for Economic Integration, Sejong Institution, Sejong University, 209, Neungdong-Ro, Gwangjin-Gu,
Seoul, 05006, Korea
TEL : +82-2-3408-3338    FAX : +82-2-3408-3338   E-mail : jei@sejong.ac.kr
Browse Articles |  Current Issue |  For Authors and Reviewers |  About
Copyright© by Center for Economic Integration. All right reserved.