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Journal of Economic Integration 2013 December;28(4) :610-630.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.11130/jei.2013.28.4.610
Intensity of Trade with the EU and Corruption in Africa
Omer Gokcekus and 
Yui Suzuki 
Seton Hall University, South Orange, U. S. A.
Corresponding Author: Omer Gokcekus ,Tel: +1 9733136272, Fax: +1 9732752519, Email: omer.gokcekus@shu.edu.
Copyright ©2013 Journal of Economic Integration
ABSTRACT
Via partnership agreements, the EU provides African countries with access to its markets and asks for compliance with a given set of good governance norms and procedures. While the EU markets are significant for African countries, African markets are not significant for the EU. This asymmetric relationship should give the EU the power to “convince” the African countries to adopt better governance practices. Results from panel data regression analyses indicate that for 34 African countries, an increase in the intensity of trade and imports from the EU between 1984~2009 reduced the level of corruption, but not always the intensity of exports to the EU. These findings do not provide strong evidence in favor of the idea that the EU has effectively used its asymmetric trade relationship in convincing African countries to adopt better governance practices, but they consistently support alternative-rival-hypotheses, namely trade openness and imports-as-market discipline hypotheses.

JEL Classification
C23: Models with Panel Data; Longitudinal Data; Spatial Time Series
F14: Empirical Studies of Trade
O10: General
Keywords: Intensity of Trade | Conditionality | Corruption | European Union | Africa
 
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