Multilateral Tariff Negotiations when Production is Fixed

Naya, José Méndez; Naya, Luciano Méndez

doi:2002.17.4.811

Journal of Economic Integration 2002 April;17(4) :811-825.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.11130/jei.2002.17.4.811

Multilateral Tariff Negotiations when Production is Fixed

José Méndez Naya, Luciano Méndez Naya

Universidade de A Coruña
Universidade de Santiago

ABSTRACT

This paper contributes to analysis of the extent to which multilateral trading agreements reached under GATT can liberalize the world economy. Its main conclusion is that free trade is not sustainable if production is fixed exogenously and utility is non-transferable. If production is fixed and utility is transferable, free trade is possible but is not necessary for maximization of welfare. JEL Classification (F12, F13, F15)

Keywords: International Trade | Trade Negotiations | Imperfect Competition

REFERENCE

1.	Brander, J. A. and P. R. Krugman (1983), "A Reciprocal Dumping Model of International Trade", Journal of International Economics, 15, 313-321.

2.	Brander, J. A. and B. Spencer (1985), "Export Subsidies and International Market Share Rivalry", Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.